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Abstract
In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemmas
experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and struc-
ture, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate
parameters of a learning model. We test robustness of the estimator.
We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial
evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more coop-
eration in spatial structures than in spaceless ones—regardless whether interaction
neighbourhoods have the same or different sizes in both structures. We find that
with some interaction neighbourhoods even the opposite may hold.
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1 Introduction
How does the structure of interaction affect an evolutionary process? Axelrod (1984,
p. 158ff) gives an early and influential example that is based on a prisoners’ dilemma:
In a situation where all players are interacting with all other players in the same way,
defectors are always more successful than cooperators and, as a result, cooperation will
die out. However, if interaction is local, i.e., players are only interacting in neighbour-
hoods, cooperation can grow in clusters. As a result, only cooperators on the border of
these clusters are exploited by defectors. The local structure protects the emergence of
cooperators. Axelrod presents this idea with a specific evolutionary dynamic: players
use a copy best rule, i.e. they choose the strategy with the currently highest payoff in
their neighbourhood. Nowak and May (1992), Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) and
several other articles1 follow this approach. A simple rule like copy best can apparently
explain how cooperation emerges through naive imitation in networks and, thus, opens
the door for a host of new and interesting equilibria.
How convincing is such an explanation? In this paper we use experiments to test
whether players’ behaviour can safely be approximated as sufficiently similar to copy best,
and whether players, indeed, are more likely to cooperate if they are in local interaction.
We will put emphasis on the assumption of symmetric learning that is implicit in the model
of Axelrod and his successors. When players change their strategy, they copy the most
successful strategy in their neighbourhood. This strategy can be a player’s own strategy
or a strategy of a neighbour. Assuming this symmetric treatment of neighbours’ and
own information may be obvious and innocent in some contexts. E.g. biological evolution
does not have the cognitive capabilities to make a distinction between the success of an
incumbent species and the success of an invading species. However, evolution of human
behaviour may be able to treat own success and the success of neighbours in different
ways. Depending on the environment it might be rational to make such a distinction. If
agents and neighbours are in the same environment a neighbours’ experience is as good as
an agent’s own experience—there is no reason to value information from different sources
differently. In a heterogeneous environment, though, the experience of a neighbour may
be specific to a situation that is different from the agent’s situation. It might be wrong to
draw inference from a neighbour’s payoff to one’s own success2. In such an environment
agents should learn relatively more from their own experience and relatively less from the
experience of other players.
To control the degree of homogeneity in our experiments, we compare two structures:
In one structure agents are located on a circle and interact in overlapping neighbourhoods.
This is what we call local interaction or a spatial structure. In such a structure players’
environments are not entirely identical. Players may learn from their neighbours, however,
their neighbours’ success might be due to opponents that are not part of the interaction
neighbourhood of the learning players. In the other structure agents are in a homogeneous
group where each agent is equally likely to interact with every other agent. This is what
we call group interaction or spaceless structure. In this structure all agents face the same
1See also Nowak and May (1993), Bonhoeffer, May, and Nowak (1993), Lindgreen and Nordahl
(1994), Kirchkamp (2000).
2See Kirchkamp (1999).
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interaction partners.
We will now in section 2 summarise some arguments that have been made in the con-
text of imitation and local interaction and which we find helpful to understand our setup.
Section 3 presents a theoretical argument that is based on imitation and that suggests
more cooperation in a spatial world than in a non-spatial world. Section 4 describes the
setup of the experiment. Section 5 presents the experimental results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature and Motivation
From several other experiments we know that players learn from their own experi-
ence and that they also imitate. A classic study that describes how players learn
from their own experience is Erev and Roth (1998). Pingle and Day (1996) find that
participants of their experiments imitate choices of others to economise decision cost.
Offerman and Sonnemans (1998) observe that players imitate beliefs of other players if
these are available. Offerman and Sonnemans (1998, p. 571) suggest that own experience
might be “more important” for the adaptation of beliefs than naive imitation of others.
What kind of framework should we use in order to study learning and imitation?
Here we follow Axelrod’s idea and choose a very simple framework, a prisoners’ dilemma.
This is not the only possible choice. Some recent studies of imitation behaviour use
the context of an oligopoly. The oligopoly framework is particularly interesting in the
context of learning and imitation since learning and imitation may affect the equilib-
rium process. Vega-Redondo (1997) presents a theoretical analysis of a Cournot oligopoly
and finds that an imitation based evolutionary process converges to the Walras equilib-
rium which is far away from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is also more com-
petitive. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999) and Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans
(2002) use experiments to find that players do imitate and do indeed tend to converge
to the Walras equilibrium in oligopolies if information about other players is available.
Selten and Ostmann (2001) develop the theoretical concept of an imitation equilibrium
which is studied in Selten and Apesteguia (2002) with the help of an experiment based on
an oligopoly with spatial competition. Selten and Apesteguia find that, indeed, features
of the imitation equilibrium describe parts of actual behaviour better than the Cournot
Nash concepts. In another oligopoly experiment, however, Bosch-Dome`nech and Vriend
(2003) find imitation not to be a driving force in the experiments and, accordingly, no
convergence to the Walras equilibrium.
These experiments help to distinguish among different equilibrium concepts in
oligopoly models. However, these experiments also show that the framework oligopolistic
interaction is perhaps not ideally suited to disentangle imitation of others from learning
from own experience. The reason is the large strategy space that usually comes with the
model of an oligopoly. Players can and will choose many different strategies among a
large number of possible quantities. Often players will choose new quantities that have
not been tried before. How can we interpret the choice of new quantities as imitation
or learning from own experience? Perhaps the chosen strategy was close to one or more
successful strategies used by other players or used by the learning player, but how close
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must a choice be to be qualified as imitation? With so many candidate strategies one
needs additional assumptions to relate players’ choices to past strategies.3
With the prisoners’ dilemma we study a game with only two strategies and, thus,
reduce the above problem substantially. This game is conceptually close to an oligopoly
game, still, with only two strategies it is technically easier to interpret choices as learning.
Furthermore, a prisoners’ dilemma is not only interesting because it describes the well
known dilemma situation. What is useful here are two other properties: firstly, learning
and myopic optimisation may call for very different actions in this game, and, as mentioned
above, the interaction structure may crucially determine the behaviour of a population.
If players copy successful strategies from their neighbours, cooperation may be a stable
outcome in prisoners’ dilemma games in a locally structured population, but can not be
stable in a population without such a structure (see footnote 1).
Experiments where players are linked through a network and, thus, are in a hetero-
geneous situation have been done with coordination games, market games and prisoners’
dilemma games. Kosfeld (2003) provides an exhaustive summary of networks experiments.
Close to our study are those of Keser, Ehrhart, and Berninghaus (1998), Cassar (2002),
and Selten and Apesteguia (2002).
Keser, Ehrhart, and Berninghaus (1998) study how the structure of the network affects
selection of Pareto and risk dominant equilibria in coordination games. However, in
coordination games we can not distinguish between a player who chooses a strategy as a
result of imitating successful neighbours, and a player who chooses a strategy as a result
of myopic optimisation. Both motives call for the same action. Since we want to learn
more about imitation we have to study a different game.
Cassar (2002) studies coordination games and prisoners’ dilemmas. In her experiments
with prisoners’ dilemmas she finds how perturbations in the structure of a spatial network
affects choices. She compares three structures, a local one, a slightly perturbed one (what
she calls a small world) and a random network. She finds an interesting non-monotonicity:
The slightly perturbed network yields the smallest amount of cooperation.
Selten and Apesteguia (2002) study an oligopoly with a spatially differentiated prod-
uct. They are, however, not interested in the relation between learning from own ex-
perience versus imitation. They do not measure this relationship and they do not vary
the heterogeneity of their environment. What they find is that imitation seems to be a
relevant factor. What we want to find in this article is how relevant this factor is, as
compared to learning from own experience.
While we use space here to model similarity of situations and to allow studying the
3A solution for a related problem is used by Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2000). In each round
the authors determine a best-reply quantity and an imitation quantity. Then they count the number
of choices that are within an interval around these two quantities. If we want to use this approach to
distinguish between imitating others and learning from own experience we have to deal with the problem
that in each round the best strategy is either used by the learning player or used by one of the other
players. In each round there is one explanatory observation missing. To impute this missing observation
one could assume that players create two polynomial models, one for own experience and the other for
others’ experience and then maximise given these models to find the missing observations. In this paper
we reduce complexity by reducing the strategy space. We may still have to impute some missing values,
but we can do this in a much simpler way.
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evolution of strategies, space is also crucial in many economic situations. Restaurants or
shops along a street do not compete with the same intensity with all other restaurants or
shops. Strategic interaction and imitation of successful strategies may be more important
among producers of similar products. Should we, therefore, find more tacit collusion in
industries where product space or geographic space is relevant for interaction?
In our experiment groups of players repeatedly play prisoners’ dilemmas either within
a locally structured neighbourhood (a circle with overlapping neighbourhoods) or within
an unstructured (spaceless) group. Players receive information about their neighbours
and their own payoffs. We will see that players learn from their own experience. Success
of their neighbours, however, does not seem to play a large role. This holds for both
structures: the spatial as well as the spaceless one. As a consequence we do not find the
higher levels of cooperation in the spatial structure predicted by the theoretical literature
under the assumption of learning from neighbours (see footnote 1). Various modifications
of our setup do not change this result.
3 A simple model based on copy best
In this section we will sketch a simple and common evolutionary learning process based
on copy best4 which suggests more cooperation in a spatial environment and less in a
non-spatial one.
Let us assume that a a prisoners’ dilemma is played in a neighbourhood of n players.
Players use the same strategy against all their n − 1 neighbours. If we call the number
of cooperators nC then the payoffs from cooperation and defection, uC and uD, are as
follows:
uC = nC ·
20
n− 1
(1)
uD = nC ·
20
n− 1
+ 4 . (2)
Each cooperator contributes 20/(n− 1) points to the payoff of each neighbour, and each
defector adds 4 points to the own payoff. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix for a neigh-
bourhood of five.
In a group without local structure, non-cooperation is always more successful than
cooperation, thus, cooperation always dies out. In the upper part of figure 1 we give an
example for the copy best dynamics. A group of five players always plays the strategy
with the highest average payoff in their neighbourhood (copy best average). With a small
probability (1% in this example) players ‘mutate’ and choose the other strategy. Average
payoffs for C and D in period t are called uCt and u
D
t , respectively. The mutation rate
is called ǫ. If all strategies are used in period t, and uCt 6= u
D
t , then we can express the
probability to play c tomorrow as follows
P (ct+1) =
{
1− ǫ uCt > u
D
t
ǫ uCt < u
D
t
(3)
4Similar processes are used e.g. in Nowak and May 1992; 1993, Bonnhoeffer, Nowak, and May 1993,
Lindgren and Nordahl 1994, Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked 1998, Kirchkamp 2000.
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Figure 1 Simulated learning.
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m =C, l =D. Time is shown on the horizontal axis, different players are shown on the vertical axis.
The first mutant D makes cooperation disappear completely in groups. Cooperation in circles, however,
persists despite mutant Ds.
(The mutation rate is 1%, the imitation and interaction radius is 2, as in the experiment. Simulations
starts with 5 cooperators in the first period.)
If uCt = u
D
t or one strategy was not used in period t then players repeat their choice with
probability 1− ǫ.
Figure 1 shows an example to illustrate the dynamics. Time is shown on the horizontal
axis and different players on the vertical axis. The upper part of the figure starts in the
first period (shown on the left) with 5 cooperating players who choose cooperation until
the first mutant arrives. This happens in our example in period 13 where one player
mutates and plays D. Being now very successful, this player is imitated by all neighbours
and from period 14 on everybody plays D. Further mutants that appear in later periods
do not lead the group back to cooperation.5
In a spatial setting and with similar imitation dynamics (see footnote 1) however,
cooperation is protected through space and may survive.6 Let us assume that player 2
from table 2 knows his own payoff from playing D, which is 14, but also the payoff from
5The only way to move a population where everybody plays D back to cooperation is a simultaneous
mutation of all five players. With independent mutations this is not very likely. And even if it happens,
cooperation will not last for long since the first single mutant leads the population back to D. As a result
the population will spend most of the time in a state where most of them play D.
6With myopic optimisation Ellison (1993) players would obviously never cooperate.
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Table 1 Payoff Matrix
Own payoff:
own number of
[
neighbours
group members
]
choosing C
action 0 1 2 3 4
C 0 5 10 15 20
D 4 9 14 19 24
Table 2 Example of a neighbourhood of Cs and Ds
Player · · · 1 2 · · · · · ·
Neighbourhood of Player 2 - - ⇓ - -
Action: · · · D C C C C C D D D D D · · ·
# of other Cs in
the neighbourhood
· · · 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 1 0 0 0
Own payoff · · · 14 10 15 20 15 10 14 9 4 4 4
Average
payoff of C 12.5 15 15 14 15 15 12.5 10 — — —
payoff of D 9 11.5 14 — 14 11.5 9 7.75 7 5 4
in the neighbourhood
Max
payoff of C 15 20 20 20 20 20 15 10 — — —
payoff of D 14 14 14 — 14 14 14 14 14 9 4
in the neighbourhood
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his two D-playing neighbours, 9 and 4. The average payoff of playing D is, hence, 9. The
two C-playing neighbours of this player have a payoff of 15 and 10, on average, hence,
12.5. If player 2 copies the strategy with the highest average payoff then player 2 will
choose C in the next period—thus, cooperation will grow.7
In our example (see the middle part of figure 1) cooperation grows from the initial
configuration of only five Cs and is not much affected by mutants.
In describing the above dynamics we used the rule copy best average payoff (see the
literature given in footnote 4). A similar dynamics is copy best max which we obtain
if in equation (3) the variables uCt and u
D
t denote maximal and not average payoffs in
the neighbourhood. The bottom part of figure 1 gives an example for the copy best max
dynamics. An example for the calculation of payoffs is given at the end of table 2. As
with copy best average, also with copy best max a small cluster of cooperative players
turns out to be successful and grows through imitation.
We should note that neither copy best max nor copy best average distinguish between a
players’ own experience and his neighbours’ experience. This is expressed in the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis SYM-LEARN: Players learn as much from his neighbours’ experience as
from their own.
It is not obvious that hypothesis SYM-LEARN should hold. In a spatial structure play-
ers’ environments are not identical. Making no distinction between own experience and a
neighbours’ experience may be suboptimal.8 We summarise this in the following hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis ASYM-LEARN: Players learn relatively more from their own experience
and less from their neighbours’ experience the more local their interaction structure
is.
If hypothesis SYM-LEARN holds, then we should, following the argument sketched in
section 3 and discussed in detail in the literature (see footnote 4), expect the following:
Hypothesis COOP-SPACE: We find more cooperation in populations with a spatial
structure than in populations without such a structure.
If, however, learning is not symmetric and instead ASYM-LEARN holds, the forces of
imitation are weaker. Imitation of neighbours is, as we have seen in the example above, a
major driving force behind the survival of cooperation in a spatially structured population.
A player who looks only at his own payoff in a prisoners’ dilemma quickly learns that
defection gives a higher payoff—regardless whether this player is learning in a spatial or
a spaceless structure. We might then find the following:
Hypothesis NOCOOP-SPACE Levels of cooperation are not higher in a spatial struc-
ture.
7Once the cluster of Ds becomes small the payoff of the remaining Ds grows and the process stops
or enters a cycle. With standard imitation processes stable equilibria are often reached when clusters of
successful Cs are separated by small clusters of equally successful Ds.
8See Kirchkamp (1999).
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Figure 2 Neighbourhoods
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Circle: spatial interaction
of players through overlap-
ping neighbourhoods
Groups: non-spatial interaction, all players are either
in the same neighbourhood, or do not interact at all.
Other experiments have shown (see e.g. Fox and Guyer, 1977) that cooperation is easier
to establish in a small neighbourhood:
Hypothesis COOP-SMALL Levels of cooperation are larger in small neighbourhoods.
4 The experimental setup
In this paper we describe results from seven different treatments which are based on 44
sessions run in Barcelona and Mannheim, involving 423 participants9. Interaction in the
experiment was computerised and anonymous. The number of participants in the lab was
always larger than the size of a neighbourhood, so that participants could not identify
their neighbourhood. A list of these sessions is given in appendix A.
During a session players always interact with the same neighbours. Sessions last for
80 periods. In each period participants play a prisoners’ dilemma against all members
of their neighbourhood/group. Payoffs are the as given by equations (1) and (2). We
compare three interaction structures:
circles: This structure is shown in the left part of figure 2. Players are indirectly con-
nected through overlapping neighbourhoods of 5 players. In the experiment partic-
ipants are randomly seated in front of computer terminals that are networked to
create the neighbourhood structure. Each player interacts in each round with two
neighbours to the left and two neighbours to the right. Player x0 in the figure is in
interaction with x1, x2, and y1, y2. Player x2 is in interaction with x3, x4, and x1, x0.
Players see this structure on the screen.
9Students of the UPF in Barcelona and Universita¨t Mannheim respectively.
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Table 3 Feedback given in the different treatments
no detailed information:
History
Round
Your action
and gains are
in your neighbourhood the av-
erage payoff was with. . .
C D
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · D 14 12.5 9
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
detailed information:
History
Round
Your strategy
and gains are
your neighbours received
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · C 10 20 15 14 9
In the experiment strategies were called A and B. In some sessions A was the cooperative
strategy, in others B. This was randomly determined before the experiment. Payoffs of Cs
are shown in a box , payoffs of Ds are shown in gray . In the experiment we used different
background colours for the different strategies. In the treatment with detailed information
payoffs and strategies of the neighbours are ordered by payoff, i.e. information about the same
player may appear in different columns.
groups: This structure is shown in the middle of figure 2. Players are either directly
connected or not connected at all. As in the circle treatment each player has four
neighbours. Players see this structure on the screen.
groups with a larger neighbourhood: An example for this structure is shown in the
right part of figure 2. As in the group treatment, all players are either directly
connected or not connected at all, but the neighbourhood is larger than in the two
other treatments and has a size between 8 and 10.
Following the copy best average or the copy best max model discussed above we should ex-
pect almost no cooperation in the two group structures, and we should expect cooperation
in the circle structure.
We will study learning in two different information settings. One is closer to the copy
best average learning rule from section 3, the other is closer to the copy best max rule and
gives players some insight into the strategic structure of the game.
no detailed information: In this treatment feedback is given as shown in the upper
part of table 3. Players see their own action and payoff, as well as average payoffs
uC and uD with the two strategies in their neighbourhood (including their own
payoff). Players do not know the payoff matrix of the game (table 1) but they have
all the information they need for copy best average.
detailed information: In this treatment feedback is given as shown in the lower part of
table 3. Players see their own action and payoff, as well as all actions and payoffs in
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their neighbourhood. Payoffs and strategies of the neighbours are ordered by payoff,
i.e. information about the same player may appear in different columns at different
times. Furthermore players see the payoff matrix (table 1).
Thus, in the detailed information treatment players have all the information they
need to apply a rule like copy best max . In addition they have some information
that is not relevant for copy best max but that might be interesting for a strategic
analysis of the game.
5 Results
We will first study stage game behaviour. Anticipating our results, we will find no support
for hypothesis COOP-SPACE. Then we will relate this observation to learning. We will
see that imitation of neighbours is only a weak force. Players’ behaviour is much more
driven by their own experience than by their neighbours’ experience. This contradicts
hypothesis SYM-LEARN, but is in line with hypothesis ASYM-LEARN. The players’
actions over time are shown in appendix B.1 and B.2.
5.1 Stage game behaviour
In figure 3 we show relative frequencies of cooperation c¯ for the different treatments.
The top graphs show treatments without detailed information, the bottom graphs show
treatments with detailed information. The left graphs show relative frequencies of
cooperation over time, the right graphs cumulative distributions of relative frequencies of
cooperation for the different individuals.
Let us first look at the behaviour in groups of different sizes. Following hypothesis
COOP-SMALL we should expect less cooperation in groups with a larger neighbourhood.
We test this with the help of a one-sided t test10 and a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test.11
Results are shown in table 4. In both information treatments we find less cooperation in
large neighbourhoods (β < 0). This is significant in the detailed information treatment.
In the no detailed information treatment the difference is only weakly significant and only
for the t-test. In particular in the detailed information condition we find support for
hypothesis COOP-SMALL.
Let us now come the effect of the interaction structure. Following hypothesis COOP-
SPACE there should be more cooperation in the spatial structure (in circles) than in
groups—regardless what the size of the neighbourhood of the groups actually is. Again,
we present results of a one-sided t-test and a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test. Results
10When calculating levels of standard deviations and levels of significance we have to take into ac-
count that observations within our experimental sessions may be correlated. We can safely assume that
covariances of observations from different sessions are zero. Covariances of observations from the same
experiment are replaced by the appropriate product of the residuals Rogers (1993). We will use this
approach throughout the paper to calculate standard errors.
11The reason to present both a parametric and a non-parametric test here is the following: The
parametric test has more power. Since we want to show that in some cases where a difference is expected
no significant difference can be found, we should use the strongest possible test. Indeed, the assumption
of normality does not seem to be far fetched when we look at the cumulative distributions in figure 3.
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Figure 3 Frequency of cooperative players in circles and groups over time
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Table 4 Less cooperation in large neighbourhoods
n β t P<t z P<z
no detailed information 15 -.0348 -1.39 0.093 -1.061 0.144
detailed information 15 -.1497 -4.14 0.000 -2.694 0.004
The table shows the result of estimating (for the group experiments only) c = β0+βdlarge where dlarge = 1
in large neighbourhoods and zero otherwise. A negative β means that there is less cooperation in large
neighbourhoods.
Table 5 Different levels of cooperation in circles and groups
n β t P>t z P>z
no detailed information
circle vs. groups 18 -.0081 -.365 0.640 -0.221 0.587
circle vs. groups with large nbhds. 15 .0268 1.89 0.040 1.650 0.049
detailed information
circle vs. groups 15 -.0913 -2.89 0.994 -1.715 0.957
circle vs. groups with large nbhds. 10 .0584 2.33 0.022 1.776 0.038
The table shows the result of estimating c = β0 + βdcircle where dcircle = 1 in circles and zero otherwise.
A positive β means that there is more cooperation in circles, a negative β means that there is less
cooperation in circles.
are shown in table 5. If we use neighbourhoods of the same size as a basis of our comparison
(the circle vs. groups case in table 5) then we find no support for COOP-SPACE. The
coefficient β has even the wrong sign, i.e., there is less cooperation in circles and not more.
Only when we compare circles with a neighbourhood of 5 with groups of a neighbour-
hood of 8 to 10, we find a positive β and a significant difference.
5.2 A treatment with some computerised players
In section 3 we explained how imitation of successful neighbours supports cooperation
in a spatial environment. This argument relies on the existence of an initial cluster of
cooperators of sufficient size—with our payoff matrix five neighbouring cooperators are
sufficient to ensure imitation. An evolutionary game theorist would be confident that
in the long run and through mutations such a cluster will appear eventually. In our
experiments suitable clusters do appear, but they are not imitated. Perhaps, if these
clusters were more persistent then imitation of neighbours would start and cooperation
would grow in the local interaction structure.
To test this and to give imitation the best possible chance we introduce a cluster of five
computerised players into the circle. In figure 4 players x2, x1, x0, y1, y2 are played by the
computer and cooperate in every period. The other participants are humans who obtain
the same information as in the treatment with no detailed information. Furthermore
they are told that “. . . In addition to the players that are in a room, five players follow
14
Figure 4 The structure of circles with some computerised players
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8 x9
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8
x0
The five white dots indicate the position of computerised players that always play C. The
remaining dots indicate the position of the human players. Neither the position nor the
strategy of the computerised players was know to the human players.
Figure 5 Cooperation depending on the distance to the computerised players
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Participants were not told what strategy the computerised players would follow. Details
of the instructions can be found in appendix C. The detailed behaviour of the human
players is shown in appendix B.6.
Figure 5 shows how the frequency of cooperation depends on the distance to the com-
puterised players. We see that a good example helps a little—at least if it is close enough.
Players with a smaller distance to the computerised players cooperate significantly more.12
However, the effect is not very strong. Figure 6 shows the development of cooperation
and the cumulative distribution of the individual frequency of cooperation in the baseline
treatment and in circles with computerised players. We see that levels of cooperation are
very close to each other. A formal comparison can be found in table 6. Players who are
located immediately next to a computerised cooperator cooperate more than players from
the treatment without computerised cooperators, though the difference is not significant.
The average player in the treatment with computerised players cooperates even slightly
12A Cuzick-Altman test finds z = −2.10, P > |z| = 0.036.
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Figure 6 Cooperation in circles with some computerised players
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The left graphs show the relative frequency of cooperation for each period in each treatment. The right
graphs show the cumulative average frequency (averages for each player) for the different treatments.
Table 6 Increase in cooperativeness due to computerised cooperators
n β t P>t z P>z
immediate neighbours of
of computerised players 14 .0366 .622 0.272 0.333 0.369
all players 14 -.0314 -2.38 0.983 -1.533 0.937
The table shows the result of estimating c = β0 + βdcomp where dcomp = 1 in circles with computerised
players and zero otherwise. A positive β means that there is more cooperation with computerised co-
operators, a negative β means that there is less cooperation with computerised cooperators. Test are
against dcomp ≤ 0.
less than those without.13
To summarise: Even introducing a ‘permanent good example’ does not increase sig-
nificantly the frequency of cooperation in circles. If we find no support for hypothesis
COOP-SPACE the reason can not be that there are not sufficiently many cooperative
players to imitate. There must be another cause—we suspect that players do not imitate
at all. This is what we will test in the next section.
13Another experiment which is not presented here and where participants were not explicitely informed
about computerised participants leads to very similar results. Knowing or not knowing about the existence
of computerised opponents does not change the cooperativeness by a significant amount (t = −1.46,
P>|t| = 0.176, z = −0.913, P>|z| = 0.361). This is in line with Zamir and Winter (2005) who find that
explicitely telling or not telling participants about the presence of computerised players does not affect
behaviour in an ultimatum bargaining game.
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5.3 Learning
In this section we will investigate hypothesis SYM-LEARN and ASYM-LEARN. We use a
logit model to describe discrete choices between two alternatives, C and D. This allows us
to draw inference from choices to the learning process. Own payoffs from C and D at time
t will be called uc,ownt and u
d,own
t , respectively. In a similar way u
c,other
t and u
d,other
t describe
average payoffs of the other players with the two strategies. If a given action s ∈ {C,D}
was not chosen at time t by a player or in the neighbourhood (i ∈ {own, other}) then we
recursively use us,it := u
s,i
t−1 until we reach a period where s was chosen. One could say that
uc,ownt , u
d,own
t , u
c,other
t , u
d,other
t represent the most recent information players have about the
success of their strategies at time t. In line with equation (3) we use differences in payoffs
of C and D as explanatory variables of our model. ∆ownt := u
c,own
t −u
d,own
t is the difference
between payoff from cooperation and payoff from non cooperation as experienced by
the player in period t. ∆othert := u
c,other
t − u
d,other
t is the difference between payoff from
cooperation and payoff from non cooperation as experienced by player’s neighbours in
period t.
We will also look at average payoffs of the two strategies over all periods until period
t. We will call average payoffs u¯c,ownt , u¯
d,own
t , u¯
c,other
t , u¯
d,other
t . Differences between average
payoffs are called ∆¯ownt and ∆¯
other
t .
To allow for some inertia we include the current choice ct which we code as 1 if the
player cooperates today, and 0 otherwise. We will first estimate
P (ct+1) = L
(
β0 + βcct + β
own∆own + βother∆other + γown∆¯own + γother∆¯other
)
(4)
where L(x) = ex/(1 + ex), ct+1 is 1 if a player cooperates tomorrow, and 0 otherwise.
Table 7 compares results of two estimation models for equation (4), a GEE and a logit
model. The GEE model takes the autocorrelation of payoffs and choices into account and
models equation (4) as an AR(1) process. The logit model disregards the autocorrelation.
We see that estimated coefficients are very similar for the two methods. Since the GEE
estimator does not always converge for subsets of our data we will present results for
subsamples in the following only for the logit model.
We also see that coefficients for ∆¯own and ∆¯other are close to zero and not significant
at all. We will therefore concentrate on ∆own and ∆other in the following and estimate a
simplified version of equation (4).
P (ct+1) = L
(
β0 + βcct + β
own∆own + βother∆other
)
(5)
Before we come to the estimation result for equation (5) let us first check where we would
find a learning rule like copy best . As said above, we are interested in a comparison with
the more theoretical literature (Axelrod (1984), Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998),
Nowak and May (1992), and others). This literature assumes that players use a copy best
imitation mechanism when they update their strategy. In each period they determine
the strategy with the highest payoff in their neighbourhood and follow this strategy in
the next period. If payoffs of C and D are the same they stick to their current strategy.
What would a GEE or a logit modes estimate if confronted with such a behaviour? To
17
Table 7 Estimation of equation (4)
GEE logit
ct 2.601 1.793
(83.10)** (19.50)**
∆own 0.054 0.059
(16.26)** (6.71)**
∆¯own 0.002 0.004
(0.43) (0.20)
∆other 0.009 0.011
(4.05)** (2.87)**
∆¯other 0.001 0.001
(0.21) (0.16)
constant -1.811 -1.536
(66.25)** (19.60)**
Observations 30599 30599
∆ denotes the current payoff difference between the two actions, ∆¯ denotes average payoff difference.
Estimated coefficients, thus, denote propensities to learn from own and other current or average payoffs.
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
answer this question we use a Monte Carlo study. We simulate the same situation as in
the experiment, a circle of 18 players who play for 80 periods. Players follow the learning
rule that is used by Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998).
In order to narrow down the properties of this process Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked
(1998), Kirchkamp (2000) Nowak, Sigmund, and El-Sedy (1993), and others use muta-
tions, i.e. they assume that with a small probability p players make a mistake and choose
the opposite strategy. For each mutation rate we simulate 1000 groups of six circles and
present average estimates of the coefficients of equation (4) in figure 7.
The two curves in the left part show the result of our Monte Carlo study. Each point in
each curve corresponds to one mutation rate. Mutation rates are shown next to the curve.
A mutation rate of p = 0.5 corresponds to random behaviour—half of the time players
choose the right strategy, and half of the time they choose the wrong strategy. Thus, both
coefficients βown and βother are estimated to be zero. For smaller mutation rates behaviour
is more structured. We see that for all mutation rates the GEE and the logit estimate are
above the 45◦ line, i.e. βother > βown. The intuition is that when calculating the average
payoff of a strategy all players are treated equally. The payoff experience of the learning
player has a smaller impact than the experiences of the four neighbours.
Finding βother > βown is, hence, what we should expect in a world where players
use a copy best rule, i.e. where hypotheses SYM-LEARN and SYMSTR hold. Finding
βother < βown would be evidence for ASYM-LEARN.
We did similar simulations for groups. As we have already seen in section 3 cooperation
dies out quickly in the group setting. Therefore estimated coefficients are independently
of the mutation rate very close to zero. In figure 7 estimation results could not be visibly
18
Figure 7 copy best versus experimental results
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The curves in the left part of the figure show results of our Monte Carlo study. They show
how a GEE or a logit estimate perceives copy best behaviour (mutation rates are shown
next to the curve).
For comparison our experimental results are shown in the same figure (Exp-Circle. . . and
Exp-Group. . . ). Most of the experiments can be found below the 45◦ line.
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Table 8 Estimation of equation (5)
GEE logit
all all circle groups large groups
detailed
info
computerised
cooperators
detailed
info
detailed
info
ct 2.601 1.793 1.137 1.930 1.238 1.925 2.035 1.910 2.031
(83.70)** (19.28)** (7.89)** (18.73)** (5.37)** (9.39)** (17.52)** (14.44)** (8.64)**
∆own 0.054 0.061 0.080 0.062 0.119 0.049 0.033 0.056 0.031
(18.59)** (8.90)** (3.76)** (4.49)** (9.76)** (2.45)* (2.96)** (2.75)** (1.20)
∆other 0.010 0.012 0.049 0.021 0.018 0.059 -0.089 0.004 0.004
(9.49)** (5.57)** (1.72) (1.27) (1.59) (1.64) (2.93)** (1.14) (0.71)
Constant -1.816 -1.546 -1.306 -1.471 -1.208 -1.492 -2.064 -1.943 -1.926
(74.72)** (31.79)** (16.42)** (11.70)** (12.41)** (8.80)** (9.06)** (10.11)** (4.54)**
Observations 30599 30599 5214 6386 4343 3408 3526 4041 3681
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, When calculating
levels of standard deviations and levels of significance we take into account that observations within any
of our sessions may be correlated (see footnote 10).
distinguished from the origin.
Table 8 presents estimation results for equation (5). The two leftmost columns compare
the GEE with the logit estimation. The coefficients of ∆own and ∆other are similar to the
ones estimated for equation (4) in table 7, so ignoring average payoffs did not affect the
estimation results too much. The columns further to the right show estimation results for
the different treatments. We should note two things:
• With only one exception the coefficient of ∆own is always larger (and not smaller)
than the coefficient of ∆other. We can, thus, reject hypothesis SYM-LEARN and
support hypothesis ASYM-LEARN.
• Coefficients are always smaller in the treatments with detailed information. In one
case the coefficient is even negative. Furthermore, the ct coefficient is always larger
in the treatments with detailed information. We presume that when detailed infor-
mation is available imitation becomes less important and strategic considerations
have more influence.
5.4 Learning how to learn
In the discussion in the previous sections we always assumed that learning and reciprocity
were constant over time. In figure 8 we see that changes over time do not follow an obvious
pattern. The figure shows results of estimating the GEE population-averaged model
of equation (5) for subsets of 10 adjoining periods of all experiments without detailed
information. To simplify the figure we show
∑
i∈{own,other} λ
i as an indicator for learning
20
Figure 8 Learning and reciprocity over time
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The figure show
∑
i∈{own,other} λ
i as a measure for learning and
∑
i∈{own,other} ρ
i as a mea-
sure for reciprocity.
and
∑
i∈{own,other} ρ
i. All major results that we found above seem to hold during the whole
experiment. Trends, if they can be found at all, are weak and not significant.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to better understand how players learn and how their learning
behaviour depends on the heterogeneity of their environment. We concentrated on copy
best learning, which is a common model of learning in the literature on local interaction.
We have seen that learning of human players, in particular in heterogeneous structures,
does not fit copy best very well. Players do imitate others sometimes, but they seem to
learn primarily from their own experience.
We think that this is a worthwhile contribution to the literature that builds upon
imitation in local interaction models to explain cooperation. This literature explains
very elegantly how local interaction supports cooperation in an evolutionary context.
Regardless whether interaction neighbourhoods have the same or different sizes in both
structures we should always find more cooperation in the local interaction structure.
We find that at least with interaction neighbourhoods of similar sizes even the opposite
may hold. Survival of cooperation in a spatial structure depends substantially on naive
imitation of others. If, as we find in our experiments, imitation plays a only a minor rule
in particular in spatial settings, cooperation breaks down.
We also find that the available information affects the amount of imitation in
an intuitive way. When more information is available players rely less on imita-
tion. Given that in other games imitation is not much affected by information (see
21
Bosch-Dome`nech and Vriend, 2003, though they find that other elements of behaviour
are affected by complexity) complexity of the game itself might be a moderating factor.
In the fairly complex game of Bosch and Vriend players might overlook information al-
together, always relying on a certain amount of imitation. In simpler games, like the
prisoners’ dilemma, information, if available, may have some impact and may displace
imitation.
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A List of Sessions
Overview:
Number of sessions in different treatments
information provided: detailed not detailed not detailed
computerised
cooperators
circle, neighbourhood of 5 5 4 5
group, neighbourhood of 5 10 9 0
group, neighbourhood of 8. . . 10 5 6 0
Parameters of each session:
date structure information
computerised
cooperators
number of
players
1 19991203111 group 5
2 19991203112 group 5
3 19991203141 group 5
4 19991203142 group 5
5 19991203143 group 5
6 19991213131 group 5
7 19991213132 group 5
8 19991213133 group 5
9 19991213134 group 5
10 20050418-11:05-1 group 8
11 20050414-18:23-1 group 9
12 20050414-18:23-2 group 9
13 20050419-11:15-1 group 9
14 20050414-16:05-1 group 10
15 20050414-16:05-2 group 10
16 19980115-gr1 group detailed 5
17 19980115-gr2 group detailed 5
18 19980115-gr3 group detailed 5
19 19980122-gr1 group detailed 5
20 19980122-gr2 group detailed 5
21 19980122-gr3 group detailed 5
22 19991215131 group detailed 5
23 19991215132 group detailed 5
24 19991215133 group detailed 5
25 19991215134 group detailed 5
26 20050523-11:43-1 group detailed 10
27 20050523-11:43-2 group detailed 10
28 20050523-12:27-1 group detailed 10
29 20050523-12:27-2 group detailed 10
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
date structure information
computerised
cooperators
number of
players
30 20050524-11:31-1 group detailed 10
31 1999120113 circle 14
32 1999120119 circle 18
33 1999120213 circle 18
34 1999120218 circle 18
35 20050415-11:33 circle 5 13
36 20050421-16:39 circle 5 13
37 20050421-18:21 circle 5 13
38 20050426-16:31 circle 5 13
39 20050426-18:17 circle 5 13
40 19980121-ci circle detailed 18
41 19980127-ci circle detailed 18
42 19980217-ci circle detailed 18
43 19980218-ci circle detailed 18
44 1999121315 circle detailed 18
B Raw data
In the following graphs each line represents the actions of a player from period 1 to period
80. Cooperation is shown as m, non cooperation as l. Neighbouring lines correspond to
neighbouring players in the experiment. In all treatments without computerised coopera-
tors (sections B.7 to B.2) the last line of each block of lines is in circles always a neighbour
of the first line of the same block. In these sections the display of circles is always rotated
such that least cooperative players are found in the first and the last lines.
B.1 Circle treatment
t = 1 20 60 80
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B.2 Group treatment
t = 1 20 60 80
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B.3 Groups with a larger neighbourhood
t = 1 20 60 80
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B.4 Group treatment with detailed information
t = 1 20 60 80
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B.5 Group treatment with detailed information and a larger
neighbourhood
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B.6 Circles with some computerised players
In the display of the circles the five computerised cooperators are not displayed. Their
location is on top of the first line and below the last line of each block. The two top lines
and the two bottom lines of each block are, hence, immediate neighbours of computerised
cooperators.
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B.7 Circle treatment with detailed information
t = 1 20 60 80
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C Conducting the experiment and instructions
All experiments were carried out at Mannheim and Barcelona University. The lab as-
sistants who conducted most of the experiments were not involved in teaching, i.e. not
known to participants.14 For the group treatments always several groups were present in
the lab simultaneously. At the beginning of the experiment participants drew balls from
an urn to determine their allocation to seats. Being seated participants then obtained
written instructions in German (for the Mannheim experiments) or in Spanish (for the ex-
periments done in Barcelona). The instructions vary slightly depending on the treatment.
In the following we give a translation of the instructions.
14In a few sessions a teacher was present. Behaviour in these sessions was not found to be different
from the others.
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After answering control questions on the screen subjects entered the treatment de-
scribed in the instructions. After completing the treatment they answered a short ques-
tionnaire on the screen and where then payed in cash.
Instructions
Please sit down and read the following instructions. It is important that you read them
attentively. A good understanding of the game is a prerequisite of your success.
After having read the instructions you will continue with a little quiz on the computer
screen. There you will be asked questions that will be easy to answer once you have read
the instructions.
You may take notes but you may not talk to each other.
The structure of the neighbourhood
x1
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x5
x6
x7
x8 x9
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8
you Your gain depends on your decision and on the decision of
your two neighbours to the left and your two neighbours to
the right. These four neighbours remain the same during the
course of the experiment. You are connected through the
computer with these neighbours. We will not tell who these
neighbours are. Similarly your neighbours will not be told
who you are.
In the diagram on the right side your four neighbours are
shown cross-hatched.15
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y1
y2
y3
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y5
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y7
y8
you
Also your neighbours have neighbours. E.g. the neigh-
bours of y2 are players y4, y3, y1 and you.
16
15The size of the circle shown here and in the figure below depends on the treatment. E.g. in the
treatment with groups of five players the circle would be smaller and contain only five players.
16In the treatment with groups we say instead: “E.g. the neighbours of y2 are players x1, x2, y1 and
you.”
In the treatment with computerised players we add the following: “. . . In addition to the players that
are in a room, five players follow a computerised strategy. Up to two of your neighbours may belong to
these players. . . ”
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Rounds
In this experiment you play several rounds. In each round you take a decision. Depending
on your decision and on the decision of your neighbours you receive points that will be
converted to ¤ at the end of the experiment.
Decision
In each round you choose among two decisions. You choose A or B. Your gain depends
on what you have chosen and on how many of your neighbours have chosen A or B.
This relation between choices and gains is the same for all participants. If you choose
e.g. A, and all your neighbours choose B than you receive the same number of points as
any other person who chooses A while the neighbours of this person all choose B. All
players choose simultaneously, without knowing the decision of the others.17
When all players have made their decision we continue with the next round.
Information after each round
In each round your receive information about your gain. Additionally you receive infor-
mation about the decision of your neighbours and their gain.
Round Your Decision Your Gain Average gain
with A in your
neighbourhood
Average gain
with B in your
neighbourhood 18
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In each row you obtain information about one round. You find your decision and your
gain in the second and the third column.
In the two columns to the right you find the average gain of all players on your neigh-
bourhood who chose A and the average gain for those who chose B. The average gain is
17In the treatment with detailed information the first part of this paragraph reads instead as follows:
This relation between choices and gains is the same for all participants. It will be shown on the screen
in the form of a table.
Your neighbours play. . .
You play A
You play B . . . Your gain . . .
All players choose simultaneously, without knowing the decision of the others.
18In the treatment with detailed information there is only one column with the title: “Decisions and
gain in your neighbourhood, ordered by gain”
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the sum of gains of all players in the neighbourhood who made a decision divided into
the number of these players. Your own gain is included when calculating average gains.
If nobody in the neighbourhood has chosen A or B these columns will be marked with
“—”.19
Quiz
Please answer now the questions from the quiz on the computer screen. If you are unsure
how to answer a question, please consult your instructions.
19In the treatment with detailed information the previous two paragraphs read instead “On the right
side we show for each of your neighbours the decision of the neighbour and the obtained gain. The
ordering of neighbours in this column depends on the gain in this period. First comes the neighbour with
the highest gain, then the one whose gain was second, etc.. This implies that in each period a different
person can be the first in the right column.”
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